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ABSTRACT
 This paper explores some connections between depictions of mortality in portrait-painting 
and philosophical (and psychoanalytic) treatments of our need to be recognized by others. I 
begin by examining the connection that Georg Simmel makes in his philosophical study of 
Rembrandt between that artist’s capacity for depicting his portrait subjects as non-repeatable 
individuals and his depicting them as mortal, or such as to die. After noting that none of Simmel’s 
explanations of the tragic character of Rembrandt’s portrait subjects seems fully satisfactory, 
I then turn to Rousseau’s writing on our need for the recognition of others in order to argue 
that (1) it is at least as sources for the satisfaction of this need that other persons figure for us 
as irreplaceable (in a way that contrasts with the kinds of satisfaction that intersubstitutable 
things afford us); and that (2) it is exactly this kind of irreplaceability that Simmel is gesturing 
at in connecting the concepts of individuality and mortality in his writing on Rembrandt’s 
portraits. For the remainder of the paper I argue that the foregoing ideas are in fact central to 
the psychoanalytic writing of Melanie Klein, and in particular (a) Klein’s understanding the 
infant’s apprehension of other persons as internally related to their anxieties about the possibility 
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of those persons’ irretrievable loss; (b) her understanding that it is as sources of recognition 
that others’ personhood is made salient to us; and (c) her treatment of portrait-painting as an 
activity for working through those aforementioned anxieties.
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RESUMEN
Este artículo explora ciertas conexiones entre la representación de la mortalidad en el retrato 
y el tratamiento filosófico (y psicoanalítico) de nuestra necesidad de ser reconocidos por los 
demás. En primer lugar, se examina la conexión que establece Georg Simmel en su estudio 
filosófico sobre Rembrandt entre la capacidad del artista para representar en sus retratos indi-
viduos irrepetibles, y su capacidad para capturar la finitud de los mismos en tanto que seres 
mortales. Tras señalar que ninguna de las explicaciones de Simmel sobre el carácter trágico 
de los sujetos de los retratos de Rembrandt resulta completamente satisfactoria, recupero los 
escritos de Rousseau sobre nuestra necesidad de ser reconocidos por los otros, para argu-
mentar que (1) consideramos que los otros son insustituibles porque son capaces de satisfacer 
esta necesidad (de una manera que no tiene nada que ver con los tipos de satisfacción que nos 
brindan las cosas sustituibles); y que (2) es, precisamente, a esta clase de insustituibilidad a 
la que apunta Simmel al enlazar los conceptos de individualidad y mortalidad en sus escritos 
sobre los retratos de Rembrandt. A partir de este punto, sostengo que las ideas anteriores son, 
de hecho, centrales para la comprensión de la escritura psicoanalítica de Melanie Klein, y, en 
particular, (a) al planteamiento de Klein sobre la percepción de las otras personas por parte de 
los niños, que relaciona con sus ansiedades acerca de la posibilidad de la pérdida irreparable 
de esas personas; (b) su planteamiento de que la condición de persona del otro se debe a que 
los percibimos como fuentes de reconocimiento; y (c) su análisis de la pintura de retratos como 
una actividad con la que abordar estas ansiedades.
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In memory of Marcela Josefina Ríos 
Dordelly (1946-2018), a painter
What relationship might there be between depictions of death and mortality in 
portrait-painting and our need to be recognized by others? Here I want to carry 
through a provocative line of thought that I find in the German philosopher and 
sociologist Georg Simmel’s 1916 philosophical study of Rembrandt, though it 
will require discussing two other writers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and (at some 
length) Melanie Klein, also concerned with recognition and the peculiar kind 
of loss characteristic of our relations to other persons.
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i. themes from simmel
Simmel begins the second chapter of his study (titled «Individualization 
and the General») by noting that «the portrait figures of the Renaissance 
always appear to be somehow typical, while Rembrandt’s give the impression 
of individual uniqueness» (R: 61). And throughout his book he grounds this 
supposed contrast—between the depiction of types characteristic of the Re-
naissance (especially the Italian Renaissance), and Rembrandt’s depiction of 
unique individuals—in their contrasting conceptions of a human being. On 
the Renaissance conception, according to Simmel, there is nothing distinctive, 
among all particulars, about the ways in which human beings instantiate general 
concepts: «all individual characteristics are generalities» (R: 67). Thus, on this 
conception, a human being is not anything above and beyond the general and 
repeatable traits they instantiate. Simmel opposes this to a conception where-
by a human being is more than the instantiation of their general traits, in the 
sense that the unification of those traits in that individual is not a repeatable 
phenomenon. That individual human being is the way they unify their general 
traits. And, according to Simmel, Rembrandt’s particular talent in his portraits 
was to capture the unique and unrepeatable way in which an individual brings 
those traits together.
 My aim is not to defend the preference Simmel clearly has for Rem-
brandt over Italian Renaissance painting (a preference that occasionally reads 
as northern European chauvinism). And it is not always clear what it is about 
human beings such that they allow for the peculiar kind of unification of traits 
of concern to Simmel—their condition as living things, or as exhibiting what 
Simmel calls «inner life»—just as it is not clear whether he thinks that all 
human beings are in his sense a unity or «totality.» (I will soon return to this 
question.) But Simmel’s fundamental contrast, represented by his opposition 
between the Italian Renaissance and Rembrandt, allows him to express unde-
niably real contrasts that tend to arise in portrait-painting. For example, it allows 
him to express the apparent paradox that adding further (repeatable) details to 
a portrait can take us even further from capturing a subject’s individuality:
At least in many appearances it is precisely the specific, the minutia, that which 
turns the large general overview into the details of immediate reality—it is exactly 
this that is general, and it is exactly this that a large number of appearances have 
in common. It is precisely only in disregarding all of this in favor of the unity of 
the appearance not sundered into details that one grasps its individual essence 
and uniqueness (R: 49).
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So long as one just adds further details to a portrait, that does not take us 
outside the ambit of general traits. And typically it is through a single expressive 
stroke in a portrait that one can capture someone’s distinctive presence. There-
fore, it is one of Simmel’s theses that through such means Rembrandt «trans-
cends the naïve identification of detailing and individuality» characteristic of 
a focus on individuals as bearers of general traits (R: 49).1 (This phenomenon 
is certainly present in Rembrandt’s paintings, though the best illustrations of 
it might be in the single expressive strokes typical of his drawings.)
 This discussion takes an important turn when Simmel connects the 
individuality of Rembrandt’s portrait subjects with their mortality or peris-
hability. For example, about Rembrandt’s «laughing self-portrait of the Cars-
tanjen collection» (1666-9),2 Simmel says, «The whole is as if infused by, and 
oriented toward, death» (R: 74). And he later adds, «the thought of death has a 
remarkable relationship to the artistic relationship of the human being» (R: 76). 
From a certain angle, this is not a unique point: many writers on portraiture 
have noted that genre’s characteristic concern with mortality, especially in its 
giving expression to the fantasy of surviving death.3 But what guides Simmel’s 
writing here is something different and more specific: his sense that, whereas in 
Italian Renaissance portraits the subjects are depicted as imperishable (except 
by external violence), Rembrandt’s subjects, including those of his self-portraits, 
are (in their internal nature) such as to die.
With many Italian portraits one gets the impression that death would come to 
these people in the form of a dagger thrust. With Rembrandt’s portraits it as if 
death were the steady development of this flowing totality of life—like the current 
with which it flows into the sea, and not through violation by some new factor 
but only following its natural course from the beginning (R: 74).
This contrast in treatments of mortality is another contrast that undeniably 
arises in portrait-painting, and Simmel is making a suggestive point in connec-
1  Incidentally, Georg Lukásc, who famously combined the insights of both 
Marx and Simmel in order to understand how a typifying or «reifying» treatment of 
persons is an expression of the commodity-form under capitalism (in «Reification 
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,» in History and Class Consciousness, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone [Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press: 1971], 83-222), was 
also evidently very familiar with Simmel’s study of Rembrandt. See Lukásc, «Georg 
Simmel,» trans. Margaret Cerullo, Theory, Culture & Society 8 (1991): 145-50.
2  This self-portrait is now in the Wallraf-Richartz Museum in Cologne.
3  For example, John Berger, «The Fayum Portrait Painters,» in Portraits: John 
Berger on Artists, ed. Tom Overton (London: Verso, 2015).
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ting it with his earlier contrast between the representation of general traits and 
the representation of unified individuals. But what exactly is that connection?
 Before coming to what I think Simmel should say, I want to note that 
he occasionally bypasses his own sense of this connection’s importance by 
reaching for disappointing metaphysical explanations of the tragic dimension 
of Rembrandt’s portraits. These explanations are disappointing because they 
are either perfectly consistent with a schema of portraits as consisting just of 
general traits, or because they escape that schema only on an ad hoc basis. For 
example, Simmel tentatively suggests that, in their subjects’ evident perisha-
bility, Rembrandt’s portraits may be registering the idea that «life and death 
[are] only relative opposites,» a relationship characterized by «mutual limita-
tion and conditioning» (R: 72). But obviously there is nothing, by itself, about 
understanding mortality and life as «mutually conditioning,» or in a dialectical 
union of opposites, that excludes either’s being rendered (in philosophy or in 
painting) as a general or repeatable trait. (After all, in characterizing this view, 
Simmel is talking about a general tendency in the relationship between life 
and mortality.)
 More interestingly, Simmel later suggests that «the generality of death 
negates itself,» in that each dies «a death of [one’s] own» (R: 78-79). But even 
a highly specific way of dying can be described in general terms, and can in 
principle be shared among multiple individuals; suggesting otherwise would 
be either a vacuous appeal to singular reference («Only x can die x’s death») or 
an ad hoc limitation on the schema of general traits. And, needless to say, there 
are deeper ways of understanding the phrase «death of one’s own,» a phrase 
that Simmel draws from Rilke.4 But any one of these, say that of the absolute 
aloneness of death, will take us far from any questions about the schema of 
general traits, or Simmel’s contrasting picture of non-repeatable unities.
 It seems that if we want to understand Simmel’s own connection bet-
ween depictions of individuality and depictions of mortality in portraiture, that 
cannot turn on questions about what kind of trait (or property) mortality might 
be, but rather on questions about the categorical difference between individuals 
and traits (or between individuals and properties). And that requires conside-
ring differences in our relationships to individuals and to traits, and why traits 
admit of substitution (among their instances), whereas individual persons are 
(to us) irreplaceable. Simmel hovers around this point when he says, «the more 
individual, therefore, a person is, the more ‘mortal’ he is, because the unique 
is simply irreplaceable» (R: 77); and also when he says, «Only the individual 
dies, the type does not» (R: 76). But while those are indeed remarks about the 
4  Rainer Maria Rilke, Das Stunden-Buch (Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1905), Book 
Three.
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difference between individuals and types, they do not illuminate anything 
specifically about portraits, which focus on persons, as opposed, say, to still 
life paintings, which focus on inanimate things. Some inanimate things are, 
in some sense, irreplaceable; and all inanimate things perish while their types 
may persist. What then happened to Simmel’s insight that there is something 
specifically about human beings, as depicted in Rembrandt’s portraits, such 
that they are non-repeatable unifications of traits? In what special sense are 
human beings irreplaceable?
ii. themes from rousseau
I do not think we are immediately forced into a moral understanding of 
humans’ or persons’ irreplaceability: for example, Kant’s characterizing the 
inherent dignity of rational wills by saying that persons are «above all price» 
and admit of «no equivalent» (Kant 4:429, 4:434). Of course, I am not excluding 
the possibility that such moral notions might somehow be registered in portrait-
painting; I am only suggesting that we might first want to consider the possibility 
that some notion of persons as irreplaceable predates (either phylogenetically or 
ontogenetically) the development in humans of moral concepts. And I think we 
find such a sense of irreplaceability in the writings of a philosopher who rarely 
wrote on the visual arts, but who was famously concerned with «pre-moral» 
relations among humans (and whose writings are an important background for 
both Simmel and Kant): namely, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.5
 In the phylogenetic account of human development in his Discourse 
on Inequality, Rousseau examines at least two stages of human history prior 
to the origin in humans of a notion of «right» in a social compact.6 In the first 
5  Strikingly, Rousseau’s avowed preference for music over painting (accounting 
for his comparative neglect of the visual arts) turns on questions of which medium 
better allows us to feel the presence of another person. Music, he says, «always gives us 
some idea about our own kind…it is not possible to hear a song or a symphony without 
immediately telling oneself: another sentient being is present» (EO: 292/OC: 5:411). 
The following two paragraphs summarize the reading of Rousseau I present in «Speech, 
the Affective, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith» (The 
Adam Smith Review, vol. 11, ed. Fonna Forman, London: Routledge, 2019, 53-66) and 
at length in «Amour-Propre and Seeing Others as Persons» (unpublished manuscript).
6  These are not the only stages prior to such a compact that Rousseau examines: 
others include (just before nascent society) the gathering of humans in primitive dwell-
ings (DI: 164/OC: 3: 167), and (bringing nascent society to an end) the invention of 
private property (DI: 167-9/OC: 3: 171-4); I am only above considering those stages 
relevant to marking a distinction between amour de soi and amour-propre. The fact that 
these stages precede a social compact (either the inegalitarian compact discussed in the 
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of these, the original state of nature, the life of the asocial sauvage was prin-
cipally governed by the passion Rousseau calls amour de soi, or the desire for 
self-preservation. And the objects of amour de soi, such as food and shelter, 
were «ready to hand» (DI: 143/OC: 3:144) at least in the sense that there was 
nothing in the nature of those objects such that they could not be had, and 
without spoiling their satisfactoriness, through force or through exercises of 
the will. Therefore, the world, from the perspective of the sauvage, was a world 
of things, in that he desired nothing that was unavailable to exercises of his 
will and the contingent limitations of his abilities. Indeed, this way of relating 
to the world even characterized his relations to others of his kind: he related 
to other humans just as instruments or impediments to the satisfaction of his 
amour de soi, and so when they stood in his way, he saw them just as «natural 
occurrences, without the slightest stirring of arrogance or resentment,» and 
he reacted to them «with no other passion than the pain or pleasure at success 
or failure» (DI: 218/OC: 3:219-20).
 But things fundamentally change with the birth of social relations, when 
«everyone began to look at everyone else and wish to be looked at himself, and 
public esteem [became prized]» (DI: 166/OC: 3:169-70). In this moment (what 
Rousseau calls «nascent society;» DI: 167, 172/OC: 3:170, 176) humans’ mutual 
relations are indeed governed by amour de soi, but also by the passion he calls 
(a few pages following this passage: DI: 170/OC: 3:174) amour-propre, or the 
desire for differential recognition from others: that is, the desire to be «picked 
out» from among the manifold of persons, say for one’s talents as a singer or a 
dancer (but more generally, the desire to have one’s presence noticed).7 Thus, 
whereas the sauvage had related to others of his kind just as instruments or 
impediments to his self-preservation, members of nascent society came to 
care about what others think of them, and thereby came to value something 
Discourse on Inequality, or the egalitarian «contract» treated in The Social Contract), 
and thus precede the appearance in humans of notions of «right,» helps to isolate the 
sense in which these stages are «pre-moral.» (In The Social Contract Rousseau says of 
right that it «does not come from nature [but] is founded on conventions;» SC: I.1.2; 
and in the Geneva Manuscript of that same book Rousseau says, «the law precedes 
justice, not justice the law;» G: 160/OC: 3:329.) I am also understanding as «pre-moral» 
the natural pitié (or compassion) characteristic of the sauvage, as that is a capacity he 
shares with the non-human animals (DI: 152/OC: 3:154). (I will follow Rousseau in 
using masculine pronouns to refer to the sauvage, just as I will below follow him in 
using masculine pronouns when discussing his account of the infant.)
7  It is as differential that this recognition’s character as pre-moral is relevant: it 
contrasts with the non-differential recognition, or respect, owed another in virtue of, 
say, their status as a person or citizen, and which, for Rousseau, is principally afforded 
by a social compact.
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(another’s differential recognition) outside of what is available to exercises of 
their wills and the contingent limitations of their abilities.
 There are several important categorical differences between amour de 
soi and amour-propre, but I want to focus on how these two passions allow for 
a categorical difference (relevant to the satisfaction of our passions) between 
general traits and non-repeatable individuals. The objects of amour de soi are 
interchangeable: relative to that passion, any two qualitatively similar sources of 
satisfaction are equally satisfying. Thus, it is no loss (relative to amour de soi) 
to have one’s apple snatched, so long as a qualitatively similar one is available. 
In contrast, in valuing another’s differential recognition, the insult characteristic 
upon having that desire frustrated is in no way made up for by the recognition 
of yet another person (in some relevant way) qualitatively similar to the one I 
care about.8 As welcome as the differential recognition of yet other might be, 
none of them can make up for the insult or disappointment elicited by this one’s 
thwarting of my amour-propre. Therefore, if amour-propre makes available 
to us a distinctive way of being affected by persons, then we can say that that 
at least involves seeing others as individuals: as irreducible to their general 
traits, and as not satisfactorily exchangeable with other, qualitatively similar 
sources of satisfaction.
 From Rousseau’s writing I am thus drawing the idea that it is in virtue of 
one’s valuing another’s capacity for differential recognition of oneself that one 
appreciates or acknowledges them as a person (as opposed to a thing): indeed 
a person bearing general or repeatable traits, but also (as Simmel would put it) 
unifying those traits in the form of a non-repeatable individual. And it is also 
from Rousseau that I am drawing the idea that our relations to other persons, 
in that sense, are characterized by a peculiar kind of loss. We can lose objects 
of amour de soi, but since those objects are only satisfying to us in virtue of 
their instantiating types, that kind of loss is remediable; it is not a «real loss.» 
In contrast, losing an object of amour-propre, in the sense of understanding 
that that person’s recognition is not forthcoming—and that, through death or 
disappearance from our lives, it may never be forthcoming—is a real loss; 
its characteristic pain can survive the discovery of another person of a rele-
vantly similar type (prepared to recognize us in the desired way). It is for this 
reason that, as objects of our amour-propre, persons appear to us at once as 
non-repeatable individuals and as mortal. Or in other words: it is as sources 
of differential recognition that their individuality and their mortality come to 
matter to us.
8  On the connection between the thwarting of amour-propre and feelings of 
insult, see DI: 154, 218/OC: 3:157, 219.
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 Thanks to these ideas drawn from Rousseau, we are now in a better 
position to address some of those questions from Simmel that we left hanging. 
At the beginning I noted it is not always clear what it is about human beings 
such that they allow for the peculiar kind of unification of traits that Simmel 
discusses: he mentions both «life» and «inner life.» But Rousseau’s writing 
allows us to take seriously the hypothesis that it is humans’ capacity to bestow 
differential recognition (when we understand them to have that capacity) that 
figures fundamentally in our appreciation or acknowledgment of them as non-
repeatable individuals. One advantage of this shift in focus is that it turns us 
away from needing to locate criteria, or features relevant for being a person, in 
order to understand the connection between being a person and being a non-
repeatable individual. Of course, in some contexts, being alive (or exhibiting 
inner life) should be considered a criterion for being a person in the relevant 
sense.9 But, according to the present hypothesis, the possibility of eliciting 
such criteria is less important for understanding personhood’s connection to 
individuality and even mortality (in the sense of allowing for irretrievable loss) 
than consideration of the necessary consequences of valuing another as a source 
of differential recognition. Therefore, Simmel’s interest in human beings as 
non-repeatable individuals may need to be re-oriented toward the observation 
that it is principally other human beings (and typically not inanimate objects) 
whom we value in that peculiar way.
 Moreover, I earlier suggested that the root of Simmel’s disappointing 
metaphysical explanations of the tragic character of Rembrandt’s portraits 
consists in Simmel’s trying to specify what kind of trait mortality might be: 
this is why none of his proposals (that mortality is in a kind of dialectical union 
with life, that each person dies «a death of [one’s] own») really moves out of 
the schema of general, repeatable traits that Rembrandt’s portraits are suppo-
sed to help us out of. I therefore suggested that we turn to consideration of the 
categorical difference between general traits and individuals, and I argued that 
Rousseau’s distinction between amour de soi and amour-propre makes that 
categorical difference salient to us, in that (according to Rousseau’s phylogene-
tic account) it is only in being subject to the latter passion that other humans’ 
characters as non-repeatable individuals becomes relevant to the satisfaction 
of our desires. 
9  Nevertheless, a major theme of Stanley Cavell’s writing is the distortion in-
volved in treating «inner life» as merely an object of knowledge (admitting criteria that 
our experience of others may either fulfill or fail to fulfill), as opposed to treating it as 
eliciting the range of responses that Cavell calls «acknowledgment»: Cavell, «Know-
ing and Acknowledging,» in Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 238-66, and Part IV of The Claim of Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 329-496.
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 Therefore, this allows for a further orientation away from Simmel’s 
treatments of mortality as a trait or property: the sense of «mortality» relevant 
to understanding the tragic character of Rembrandt’s portraits, and its con-
nection to non-repeatable individuality, characterizes not a trait (or property) 
of persons, but rather a way of relating to persons such that they allow for 
irretrievable loss. (Again, as I read Rousseau’s phylogenetic account, it is only 
as objects of amour-propre—as persons whose differential recognition we 
value—that the possibility of irremediably losing them, or at least irremediably 
losing access to their recognition, becomes salient.) This re-orientation is not a 
distraction from the brute biological topic of death that seemed to be Simmel’s 
initial concern; it is rather a reminder of one of the reasons why that biological 
topic is important to us (at least when it comes to others’ deaths) in a way that 
contrasts with the loss of those things we value just because they instantiate 
general types. So long as we take our focus to be the biological topic of death 
(indeed, more generally, so long as we take our focus to be mortality’s status 
as a trait or property of persons) it will seem incredible that we can draw con-
clusions about the nature of mortality from considerations about recognition. 
But once we understand our real interest to be our ways of relating to persons 
(such that they allow for irretrievable loss), the turn to recognition no longer 
seems incredible, but rather forced by serious consideration of the various 
respects in which we value other people.10
 In summary, then: when a person is valued as a source of differential 
recognition, they are taken out of the ordinary economy of exchange and sub-
stitution (derived from our seeing things as objects of amour de soi).11 This is 
not just a way of rendering them as individuals to us; it is also an important 
way of rendering them as mortal to us, since their loss (especially through 
death) cannot be made up for by any other (even qualitatively similar) person. 
At this point my principal claims, therefore, are (1) that Simmel’s writing is 
responding to Rembrandt’s depictions of the possibility of irretrievable loss in 
his portrait subjects; (2) that this is why mortality can pervade Rembrandt’s 
portraits of any human, not just those who are close to death;12 and (3) that this 
10  I certainly do not want to deny that there are further respects (other than as 
sources of differential recognition) in which we value other people and that thereby 
allow for irretrievable loss. But one advantage of Rousseau’s phylogenetic account 
of human development is that it allows us to isolate one factor (amour-propre) and 
understand the full extent to which it can account for the former phenomena.
11  I have borrowed the phrase «ordinary economy of exchange and substitution» 
from Richard Moran, «Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty,» Critical Inquiry 38.2 
(2012): 298-329, 302, an essay that has shaped my understanding of many of the 
present issues.
12  For example, I would insist that a feeling of mortality, and the possibility 
37Individuality and Mortality in the Philosophy of Portrait-Painting...
Contrastes vol. XXIII-Nº3 (2018)
is the connection he is responding to (in those portraits) between mortality 
and individuality.
 But what about self-portraits? As a re-orientation of Simmel’s original 
framing of the connection between mortality and individuality in portrait-
painting, the foregoing would seem to take us very far even from what I have 
relied on as my guide—Simmel’s responses to Rembrandt’s portraits—since 
I have focused on our valuing others as sources of differential recognition, 
whereas Simmel’s evident paradigm of a portrait «infused by death» is 
Rembrandt’s «laughing self-portrait of the Carstanjen collection» (1666-9). 
Obviously, if there is a problem here, it rests on the extent to which we want 
to consider self-portraiture an activity or genre distinct from, as opposed to 
derived from, portraiture of others. But it seems that the most important factor, 
in understanding questions about differential recognition and irretrievable loss 
as applicable to self-portraits, is the extent to which a self-portrait is directed 
to an audience. Typically, for a painting to be intelligible (to an audience) as a 
self-portrait, it must also be intelligible (to that audience) as a portrait; and that 
typically means that the self-portraitist must somehow render themselves as 
other.13 Therefore, it is hardly surprising whenever a painter who successfully 
removes their portrait subjects from the ordinary economy of exchange and 
substitution (derived from our seeing things as objects of amour de soi), and 
whose portrait subjects therefore escape typification, also successfully remo-
ves their own self-depictions from that economy. That may indeed depend 
on rendering themselves as persons capable of differential recognition, and 
especially on the fantasy that they are among those who might receive it (that 
is, their own recognition). But it is also hardly surprising that self-portraiture 
might require a significant degree of fantasy.
of irretrievable loss, pervades Rembrandt’s portrait of a young boy (1655-60) in the 
Norton Simon Museum, Pasadena.
13  I think that this relationship between being intelligible as a self-portrait and 
being intelligible as a portrait even characterizes modernist self-portraits in which 
no human figure is discernible (and thus otherwise outside the ambit of the present 
discussion): for example, Frances Hodgkin’s «self-portrait» as still life items (in the 
Auckland Art Gallery); or modernist self-portraits that bypass altogether the represen-
tation of distinguishing traits, such as Philip Guston’s «self-portrait» as eyes behind a 
hood. (For discussion of the former, see Shearer West, Portraiture, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 198-9; for discussion of the latter, see Harry Cooper, «Rec-
ognizing Guston (in Four Slips),» October 99 (2002): 96-129, 127.)
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iii. themes from Klein
A natural additional place to turn in understanding the connection between 
loss and the acknowledgment of others as persons is the psychoanalytic theories 
of Melanie Klein. This is because Klein provides an ontogenetic account of 
human development according to which the infant’s first coming to appreciate 
its mother as a «complete person,» as opposed to a «part» (principally the nou-
rishing or life-giving breast) gives rise to a distinctive concern with losing that 
person.14 (This concern marks the moment in infant development that Klein 
calls the «depressive position.»15) Moreover, in her writing related to art and 
creativity Klein explicitly mentions portraiture as a means of registering that 
fear of loss, and also (more positively, given what I have been able so far to 
draw from Simmel) as a means of «repairing» for the extent to which that fear 
arises from our own destructive tendencies toward others. Therefore, in the 
remainder of this essay I want to consider some moments in Klein’s writing that 
help strengthen the connections within that circle of concepts (portraiture, loss, 
individuality, differential recognition) that has emerged from our considering 
Simmel’s writing on Rembrandt.
III.1. KleIn on personhood and loss
Klein understands the infant’s relationship to its outside environment as 
principally mediated by its need for gratification (its need to be fed) and its 
14  In referring to infants generally, Klein varies between using masculine pro-
nouns and using «it.» Neither is satisfactory, but I will here follow her latter practice.
15  For Klein’s reasons for using the term «position,» as opposed to «phase,» see 
MD: 275-6n1. As Hanna Segal puts the point, «The depressive position never fully 
supersedes the paranoid-schizoid position; the integration achieved is never complete 
and defenses against the depressive conflict bring about regression to paranoid-schizoid 
phenomena, so that the individual at all times may oscillate between the two;» Segal, 
Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein (London: Karnac, 1973), ix. I understand 
Klein’s ontogenetic account of seeing others (as persons) as «pre-moral» in a way that 
parallels Rousseau’s in that the major components of her account (the depressive posi-
tion, the «introjection» of complete persons) do not presuppose a developed super-ego, 
but in fact figure in the explanation of the latter’s development. There may in fact be an 
even deeper parallel between the two accounts, insofar as we take seriously Frederick 
Neuhouser’s suggestions about the role that amour-propre plays in the formation of 
the super-ego, Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the 
Drive for Recognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 247-50. Earlier in his 
book Neuhouser also draws on some Kleinian themes from N.J.H. Dent’s significantly 
Klein-influenced reading of Rousseau, Rousseau: An Introduction to His Psychological, 
Social and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); cf. Neuhouser, 132n15, 
140n22, 149n32, but see note 25 below for my differences with Dent.
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desire to avoid frustrations (particularly in being fed). Beginning in the first 
three or four months of life (TC: 61), the objects that supply gratification figure 
for the infant as «good» objects, while sources of frustration figure as «bad» 
objects: indeed, since at this stage the infant’s main source of nourishment is 
the mother’s breast or a breast-substitute like a bottle, the infant’s conception 
of reality is bifurcated into the gratifying good breast, which the infant loves, 
and the denying bad breast (the breast that withholds nourishment), which the 
infant hates. Already at this stage the infant fears a kind of loss—when the 
good breast withdraws, the infant fears it will not return—thus providing its 
characteristic anxiety or paranoia. (Klein refers to these first months of life 
in terms of the «paranoid position,» and in her later writing in terms of the 
«paranoid-schizoid position.»16)
 But the second quarter of the infant’s life is characterized by an in-
creased «differentiation» in its relation to the external world: «The range of his 
gratifications and interest widens, and his power of expressing his emotions 
and communicating with people increases» (TC: 72). This eventually allows 
for the possibility of the infant’s relating to, or «introjecting,» the person of 
the mother (or mother-figure) and later that of others in its environment. And, 
according Klein, this is immediately associated with a new concern about the 
possibility of losing that complete person.
Hand in hand with this development goes a change of the highest importance; 
namely, from a partial object-relation to the relation to a complete object. Through 
this step the ego arrives at a new position, which forms the foundation of the 
situation called the loss of the loved object. Not until the object is loved as a whole 
can its loss be felt as a whole (MD: 264).
Klein refers to this development as the «depressive position»: whereas in 
the paranoid-schizoid position the infant principally fears the bad or denying 
breast, in the depressive position the infant additionally fears losing those 
objects (its internalized parents) it has successfully introjected. Therefore, 
this new relationship to complete objects (or persons) generates in the infant 
a new kind of distress.
It seems to me that only when the ego has introjected the object as a whole, and 
has established a better relationship to the external world and to real people, is it 
able fully to realize the disaster created through its sadism and especially through 
its cannibalism, and to feel distressed about it (MD: 269).
16  Klein came to adopt the latter term under the influence of W.R.D. Fairbairn’s 
writing on schizoid mechanisms and the splitting of the ego (SM: 2n1; TC: 61n1).
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That is, the infant’s fears of losing its internalized parents come about 
mainly through its fearing the consequences of its own sadism: the destructive 
tendencies of its id, of its internalized bad objects, as well as its own «canniba-
lism,» or the fact that its relations to the external world have principally been 
through introjecting parts of persons (paradigmatically, the mother’s breast). 
The healthy development following this depressive position is the infant’s crea-
tively restoring those objects it has destroyed in its imagination, thereby feeling 
secure that those objects, as internalized parts of its ego, can survive its own 
sadistic fantasies. (This working through the depressive position is the earliest 
version of a process that the child will encounter later in life, and especially 
in mourning.17) Such reparation typically initiates with the infant’s feeling 
guilty about those sadistic fantasies, though Klein also discusses a number of 
defenses against such guilt and the ensuing process of reparation. Perhaps the 
most important of these are the «manic defenses» characterized by a feeling of 
omnipotence or triumph over the injured object, as well as a «disparagement 
of the object’s importance and…contempt for it» (MD: 278).18 In other words, 
the manic defenses consist of an assertion of one’s independence of these ob-
jects, and may consist in taking satisfaction in their perceived destructibility 
or mortality. Accordingly, when this feeling of manic omnipotence decreases, 
the child achieves greater trust in its capacity to love and in its own reparative 
powers (MMD: 353).
 Therefore, when we recall that Simmel understood Rembrandt’s por-
traits as depicting human beings as non-repeatable «unities» or «totalities» of 
traits, as opposed to aggregations of repeatable traits, we will want to ask to 
what extent this contrast is the same as Klein’s contrast between the infant’s 
apprehension of others as «complete persons» (allowing for a unification of 
good and bad aspects) and their earlier relations to others strictly in terms of 
good or bad «parts.» And, of course, this suggestion is strengthened when we 
recall that Simmel also associated depicting persons as unities or totalities 
with depicting them as mortal: this was a notion of «mortality» that, I argued, 
17  In calling this the «depressive position,» and in locating this process in the 
infant’s feared loss of its introjected parents—which notably reaches its height during 
weaning—Klein thereby offers her distinctive development of Freud’s and Karl Abra-
ham’s theories of melancholia as, like mourning, involving the loss of an object (MD: 
263-5). Cf. Freud, «Mourning and Melancholia,» in S.E., vol. 14, 243-58; Abraham, 
«A Short Study of the Development of the Libido, Viewed in the Light of Mental Dis-
orders,» in Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis (London: Hogarth, 1927).
18  On manic defenses as ways of evading a feeling of guilt, see MMD: 348-9. 
Klein also discusses obsessional (as well as manic) defenses against guilt and over-
coming the depressive position, MD: 283, 288-89; MMD: 350-53.
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is best understood not as a trait or property of persons but as a way of relating 
to the possibility of their loss.
 An immediate obstacle in developing this suggestion, however, is that, 
in trying to make sense of that distinctive possibility of loss characteristic of 
persons, I relied on the idea (which Simmel gestured at) that persons are irre-
placeable in a way that contrasts with those things we value just as bearers of 
general or repeatable traits: unlike with those things valued in the latter way, 
the loss of a person is a «real loss.» And yet Klein emphasizes creative repa-
ration as the healthy response to the loss of persons (either real or in fantasy); 
and she even mentions the infant’s search for substitutes—that is, its search 
for further affective relationships—as a normal response to that fear of loss 
characteristic of the depressive position.19
 But this may be only a superficial difference between Klein’s views 
and the arguments I presented above. After all, in interpreting Klein we need 
to understand what difference there is between that fear the infant experiences 
in its first three or four months of life (which focuses on the loss of a «part,» 
namely the nourishing «good breast») and those fears that arise in the second 
quarter of life (which focus on the loss of complete persons). Why should the 
introjection of complete persons generate a new kind of distress in the infant? 
(Surely it is not as simple as the infant’s fearing losing touch with something 
bigger than a mere part of a person.) And why should a common defense, 
generated by that fear, be the assertion of one’s independence of, or power 
over, those complete persons? I want to point out that if (despite Klein’s talk 
of «substitutes») the infant sees complete persons as irreplaceable in a way 
that contrasts with parts of persons, then we indeed have provisional answers 
to both those questions. On this proposal for reading Klein, the «distress» that 
she describes in the case of the infant who now relates to «complete persons» 
(as opposed to «parts») is a response to their experience of those persons as 
non-repeatable individuals. The infant’s own sadism (as well as the destruc-
tive tendencies of its own id, and its already-introjected bad objects) strikes it 
as especially destructive when directed to complete persons exactly because 
persons do not admit of substitution and easy reparation in the way that parts 
of persons do.
 This would also help to explain why a dependence on «complete per-
sons» (rather than «parts»), whose irretrievable loss is experienced as threa-
tened by the infant’s own sadism and destructive tendencies, might generate 
19  Klein says, «In both sexes, the fear of the loss of the mother, the primary loved 
object—that is to say, depressive anxiety—contributes to the need for substitutes; and 
the infant first turns to the father, who at this stage is also introjected as a complete 
person, to fulfil this need» (TC: 79).
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manic defenses and a feeling of power over those persons: it is often easier 
(than feeling guilt and working through the depressive position) to evade any 
acknowledgment of one’s dependence on non-repeatable individuals, and for 
whose irretrievable destruction (at least in fantasy) one might have to make 
reparation.20 And that last point might help to explain why Klein’s talk of finding 
«substitutes» is meant in a sense rather different from, and in fact compatible 
with, my talk above of persons as valued outside the «ordinary economy of 
exchange and substitution.»21 It is exactly because persons are irreplaceable 
objects of value, in a way that contrasts with mere things and even parts of 
persons, that our ways of dealing with their loss typically involves what Klein 
calls reparation. (For example, on this interpretation of Klein, it is exactly be-
cause persons are irreplaceable that mourning their loss must involve coming 
to feel secure about their place, as introjected objects, in one’s ego, MMD: 
362-3.) After all, such «reparation» is a process of moving on from the (real 
or imagined) destruction of that person; but only with what’s irreplaceable is 
there any question of how to move on from its destruction.
 On this proposal, when Klein talks about finding «substitutes» as a way 
of working through the depressive position (or working through mourning), 
she is not in fact talking about treating persons just as inter-substitutable ins-
tances of general types. (For example, she is not suggesting it is healthy what 
Rousseau, in his autobiographical writings, confesses to have done in treating 
his lover and later wife Thérèse Levasseur as a «substitute» for his earlier lover 
Françoise-Louise de Warens, whom he also consistently refers to as Maman; 
C: 310-311/OC: 1:331-2.22) In fact, such typifying (or reifying) treatment of 
persons suggests something closer to the desire to assert control over others 
characteristic of those manic defenses formed in order to avoid working through 
the depressive position.23 Rather, for Klein, working through the depressive 
20  The above constitutes my interpretation of one remark in which Klein explic-
itly refers to the loved object as «irreplaceable»: she talks about «the greatness of [the 
manic person’s] omnipotence, by which he defends himself against the fear of losing 
the one irreplaceable object, his mother, whom he still mourns at bottom» (MMD: 352). 
Moreover, in her elaboration and extension of Klein’s work, Hanna Segal mentions 
the uniqueness of the complete object as distinguishing guilt over its loss from earlier 
forms of guilt characteristic of the infant’s relations to part-objects; Segal, «A Psycho-
analytic Approach to Aesthetics,» in The Work of Hanna Segal: A Kleinian Approach 
to Clinical Practice (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 1981). 
21  Again, I have borrowed this phrase from Richard Moran’s writing on Kant 
and Proust.
22  In this context it is important to recall that Rousseau’s own mother died nine 
days after his birth.
23  This suggestion is not incompatible with social accounts of the reification of 
persons, such as Lukásc’s aforementioned account in terms of the commodity-form 
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position by finding «substitutes» (in her sense) is creative in that it allows for 
the creation of further affective attachments with others. (That is, this process 
allows one to do the work of moving on from the loss of a person, instead of 
avoiding that work by looking for another «version» of that same person.) 
Even when the mother is in fact what Klein calls «the primary loved object,» 
and even when the need to repair the (imagined or real) destruction of that 
object leads one to form further affective attachments with others, that does 
not mean one is thereby reducing those others to members of the same general 
type («mother,» or some other general type one’s mother instantiated). These 
further loved persons might in some sense be substitutes for one’s primary 
loved object (that is, attachments that allow one to move on from its imagined 
or real destruction), but they are not thereby mere substitutes.24
III.2. KleIn on personhood and dIfferentIal recognItIon
I have therefore been following through on the proposal that Klein, like 
Simmel, understands the apprehension of «complete persons» as consisting in 
seeing them as non-repeatable individuals that, because they are irreplaceable 
(in a way that contrasts with mere things or «parts») are also in a special sense 
mortal (since they allow for irretrievable loss). But in making sense of Simmel’s 
connection between seeing others as non-repeatable individuals and seeing them 
as mortal, I turned to Rousseau in order to suggest that other persons’ status 
as sources of differential recognition plays an important role in their standing 
outside the «ordinary economy of exchange and substitution.» Is there anything 
like that thought in Klein’s writing?
 In fact I think that Klein offers a fascinating expression of that thought, 
though appreciating this cannot be as straightforward as applying Rousseau’s 
distinction between amour de soi and amour-propre to Klein’s account of early 
infancy. That is, we cannot suppose that Klein’s infant is, in its first three or 
four months, governed principally by the desire for self-preservation (amour de 
soi), and only later, when it reaches the depressive position and sees others as 
«complete persons,» cares about others’ differential or evaluative recognition. 
This is because in its first months of life (characterized by the paranoid-schizoid 
under capitalism, or with Axel Honneth’s recent account in terms of the «forgetting» 
of a prior act of recognition. See Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
24  If I am correct in how I read Klein here, then her account of the depressive 
position likely constitutes a significantly increased sensitivity to the importance of 
responding to the non-repeatable individuality of others than is found in Freud’s writ-
ing on love. I am in particular thinking of Freud’s remark that «love consists of new 
editions of old traits,» and that this is «the essential character of every state of being 
in love;» Freud, «Observations on Transference-Love,» in S.E., vol. 12, 157-71, 168.
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position) the infant already experiences its gratifications and frustrations as 
somehow evaluative (and even «persecutory»): its gratifications are expres-
sions of the loving «good breast,» and elicit the infant’s own love; while its 
frustrations are expressions of the hating «bad breast,» and elicit the infant’s 
own hate. Thus, in contrast with Rousseau’s phylogenetic account, there is no 
moment in Klein’s ontogenetic account (of early infancy) in which gratifications 
and frustrations exist apart from some kind of sensitivity to evaluation by the 
outside world.25
 But even with that caveat about Klein’s account of early infancy, we 
can nevertheless see the connection I drew from Rousseau (between seeing 
others as persons and seeing them as sources of differential recognition) in 
her account of the case of an older child with an impaired ability to appreciate 
others as persons. In her 1930 paper «The Importance of Symbol-Formation in 
25  It may be difficult for us to understand rationally how anything other than a 
«complete person» could express evaluation or differential recognition (and indeed I 
think that a concern with that difficulty figures centrally in Rousseau’s thinking); but 
here of course Klein means to be characterizing features of the infant’s fantasy life in 
the paranoid-schizoid position, not what can survive rational scrutiny. Also, though 
no one has done more to demonstrate the promise of a Kleinian reading of Rousseau 
than N.J.H. Dent, with the above I depart from Dent’s Kleinian understanding of 
Rousseau’s account of infancy (as presented in his novel and educational treatise 
Emile). Characterizing the latter, Dent says that the infant normally passes through the 
«paranoid fantasy» that he is surrounded by malicious wills: «Our first apprehension 
projects a world animated almost through and through by wills intent on spiting us» 
(Rousseau, 72). But here I think that Dent reads as normal what Rousseau insists on 
as pathological. That is, in Emile Rousseau repeatedly insists that the infant must be 
kept «in dependence only on things,» as opposed to persons (E: 85/OC: 4:311; cf. 
E: 38, 89, 91, 92-3/OC: 4:247, 316, 320, 322). This is because the infant becomes 
acquainted with its environment through trying to control it, an «active principle» 
(E: 67-8/OC: 4:28) that is innocent when carried out on things, but that generates a 
«spirit of domination» when carried out on persons (E: 68/OC: 4:289). Therefore, in 
non-pathological cases, apprehension of others as persons requires having been weaned 
from the active principle. It is true that Rousseau says that the infant «senses within 
himself…enough life to animate everything surrounding him» (E: 67/OC: 4:298). 
But there Rousseau is not obviously attributing a paranoid fantasy to the infant, but 
rather describing how the infant «animates» his environment in the sense of trying to 
control it, as when «he smashes, breaks everything he can reach» (E: 67/OC: 4:288). 
It is also true that Rousseau later says, of the child who «believes himself to be the 
owner of the universe» that he «sees ill will everywhere» (E: 87/OC 4:314). But there 
again Rousseau is evidently describing a degenerate case. Related differences between 
Rousseau and Klein (making a Kleinian reading of Rousseau’s account of infancy risk 
anachronism) consist in their being separated by the Freudian revolution and the idea 
of the normalcy of infantile sexuality.
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the Development of the Ego,» Klein describes her analysis of a four-year-old 
boy, there called «Dick,» who «was largely devoid of affects, and…indifferent 
to the presence or absence of mother or nurse.» Klein adds, «it was not only 
that he was unable to make himself intelligible: he had no wish to do so» (SF: 
221).26 Here we do not need to be too concerned with the specific therapy that 
Klein pursued with Dick, which by her account consisted of playing with him, 
via those few toys and objects that interested him (trains, train stations, doors, 
and door-handles), and suggesting symbolic meanings for those toys and ob-
jects, in order to ignite in him a capacity for symbol-formation that, until then, 
«had come to a standstill» (SF: 224).27 My interest is rather in the criterion 
that Klein presents for Dick’s successfully appreciating others as persons and 
forming affective attachments to them: he comes to express caring about their 
loss or absence (when he did not before), and most importantly he comes to 
try to elicit their differential recognition (which they may or may not grant) by 
calling them.
 For example, Klein says that after some months of this therapy Dick’s 
relationships to his mother and his nurse were no longer indifferent: «He now 
desires their presence, wants them to take notice of him and is distressed when 
they leave him» (SF: 228). In other words, though Klein could not yet make it 
explicit in this early paper, through her therapy Dick arrived at that concern for 
the loss of «complete persons» characteristic of what Klein would five years 
26  Klein also says, «He had let his nurse go without manifesting any emotion, 
and had followed me into the room with complete indifference» (SF: 222). Later in 
the paper Klein diagnoses Dick with schizophrenia (SF: 229-31). William Bracken 
suggests that Dick would today be diagnosed with autism, and indeed may have been 
one of those cases of autism that, following Frances Tustin’s work, are amenable to 
psychotherapeutic treatment; Bracken, «Becoming Subjects: The Agency of Desire in 
Jacques Lacan’s Return to Freud» (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1998), 172. 
I am myself not qualified to enter into such questions of diagnosis.
27  In particular, in her play with him Klein interpreted the toys to Dick according 
to the Oedipus schema: «I took a big train and put it beside a smaller one and called 
them ‘Daddy-train’ and ‘Dick-train’. Thereupon he picked up the train I called ‘Dick’ 
and made it roll to the window and said ‘Station’. I explained: ‘The station is mummy; 
Dick is going into mummy’ (SF: 225). As Hanna Segal summarizes the case, «analysis 
revealed that [Dick’s fantasized] attack on his mother’s body led to such severe anxi-
ety that he denied all interest in her and count not therefore symbolize this interest in 
other objects or relations;» Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, 5. For 
considerations in favor of the idea that symbol-formation is itself a form of creative 
reparation rooted in working through the depressive position (thereby explaining why 
such severe anxiety would inhibit not just the acknowledgment of others as persons, 
but symbol-formation more generally) see Segal, «A Psychoanalytic Approach to 
Aesthetics,» 196.
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later call the depressive position (or «depressive anxiety»).28 According to Klein, 
this change was already evident in her first session with Dick, in which, after 
she suggested to him the symbolic significance of some of his toys, he began to 
say «Nurse?»; and «He kept repeatedly asking, ‘Nurse coming?’» (SF: 225). In 
fact, the significance of this moment, and of Dick’s coming to care about others’ 
recognition (in his coming to appreciate them as persons) was developed over 
two decades later by Jacques Lacan in his own commentary on Klein’s case. 
Lacan drew specific attention to the idea that Dick «verbalises a first call—a 
spoken call» (namely, a call for the attention of his nurse), which consists of a 
«dependency» on the person called, who can either accept or reject that call.29 
And, in a more recent development of Lacan’s commentary, William Bracken 
has noted that, in this moment, Dick «begins the work of acceding to his fun-
damental desire for recognition, opening himself up to the possibility that the 
other will refuse to reply…»30
 Therefore, following these readings of Klein’s case, it is reasonable 
to suppose that (on her view) coming to see others as «complete persons» is 
indeed (as I have been arguing) a matter of seeing them as non-repeatable 
individuals capable of irretrievable loss; but also that a significant reason why 
«complete persons» stand outside the economy of exchange and substitution 
is that they are valued as sources of differential recognition (recognition that 
can be either granted or withheld). On this interpretation of Klein’s case, the 
nurse’s acceptance of Dick’s call matters to Dick in part because no one else 
can accept that call (made specifically to her); and when he experiences her not 
coming to him as refusal, no one else’s response can make up for that feeling 
of rejection. (Klein herself is, after all, present while Dick repeatedly asks af-
ter his nurse.) This is part of the significance of Klein’s understanding such a 
«call» as a criterion for Dick’s relating to others as persons: in directing a call 
to others, he thereby relates to them as beings that refuse inter-substitution or 
replacement.31
28  Klein introduced the term «depressive position» in her 1935 paper «A Con-
tribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States» (MD: 262-89).
29  Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique 
1953-1954, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. John Forrester (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 85, 87.
30  Bracken, «Becoming Subjects,» 162. The over-arching argument of Bracken’s 
dissertation connects Lacan’s treatment of the desire for recognition to the struggle for 
recognition in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, and especially to Lacan’s reception of 
Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Hegel. I am indebted to Bracken’s dissertation for intro-
ducing me to the significance of both Klein’s case of Dick and Lacan’s comments on it.
31  Moreover, if we think of the human face (ordinarily, the focus of portraiture) 
as an especially important axis for the expression of differential recognition, and if 
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III.3. KleIn on portraIt-paIntIng
All of this would seem to take us very far from the topic of portraiture. 
But the point I have been leading up to is that, in developing these ideas (about 
the connections between the appreciation of others as «complete persons,» as 
capable of irretrievable loss, and as sources of differential recognition) portrait-
painting is evidently not far from Klein’s mind. For example, at the end of her 
1929 paper «Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the 
Creative Impulse» (the earliest of her papers that I have here drawn from) Klein 
develops portrait-painting as an example of the «reparation» required in order 
to work through those destructive tendencies (against the internalized parents) 
that initiate the depressive position.32 Specifically, she considers an account 
from a German magazine by the Danish novelist Karin Michaëlis of the latter’s 
friend, a painter there called «Ruth Kjär,» and of how Kjär arrived at portrait-
painting.33 According to Michaëlis’s article, Kjär lived a comfortable bourgeois 
life and traveled frequently; but she was also intermittently subject to suicidal 
depression, something she described by saying, «There is an empty space in me, 
which I can never fill» (IA: 215). In addition, she married the brother of «one of 
the greatest painters in the country,» and their house was consequently filled 
with modern art (IA: 215).34 When one day her brother-in-law sold a painting 
he had lent to her, this «left an empty space on the wall, which in some inex-
we think of any such axis as refusing inter-substitution or replacement (in a way that 
contrasts with «parts» or mere instantiations of general traits), then we might better 
understand the special fascination that the face holds for the infant once it apprehends 
others as «whole people.» Indeed, Klein says that at about the age that the infant «begins 
to see his mother and others around him as ‘whole people,’ his realistic perception of 
her (and them) [comes] gradually as he connects her face looking down at him with 
the hands that caress him and with the breast that satisfies him…» (W: 291). And in 
his brief aesthetic study of the human face (which anticipates many of the themes of 
his study of Rembrandt), Simmel claims that, «Of all the parts of the human body, the 
face has the highest degree of…inner unity…Aesthetically, there is no other part of 
the body whose wholeness can as easily be destroyed by the disfigurement of the one 
of its elements» (F: 276).
32  According to Ole Andkjær Olsen, Klein’s first significant use of the term «rep-
aration» appears in this paper. Again, Klein would only introduce the term «depressive 
position» six years later in «A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive 
States» (1935). Cf. Olsen, «Depression and Reparation as Themes in Melanie Klein’s 
Analysis of the Painter Ruth Weber,» The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review 27.1 
(2004): 34-42.
33  Olsen has discovered that this was in fact the Danish painter better known as 
Ruth Weber (1894-1977): «Depression and Reparation,» 37-42.
34  According to Olsen, this was the Danish artist Niels Hansen (1880-1946): 
«Depression and Reparation,» 38.
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plicable way seemed to coincide with the empty space within her» (IA: 215). 
Following a moment of despair, Kjär then proceeded to fill this empty space 
by buying paints and drawing with chalk directly onto the empty space on the 
wall, despite having no previous training in painting. The convincing result 
(apparently a painting of Josephine Baker) astounded herself and others, and 
«after this first attempt Ruth Kjär painted several masterly pictures, and had 
them exhibited to critics and the public» (IA: 216).35 Many of these paintings 
were in fact portraits of family members.
 Klein’s particular interests take her somewhat far from the rather cons-
picuous social and feminist questions arising about the liberated creativity of 
a bourgeois woman in northern Europe in the interwar period. Her account of 
Kjär’s liberated creativity is gendered only to the extent that she is interested 
in rooting Kjär’s despair about empty spaces in a «sadistic desire,» which 
Klein claims is characteristic of infant girls, «to rob the mother’s body of its 
contents…and to destroy the mother herself» (IA: 217). More generally, Kjär’s 
response to empty spaces, and her feeling of suffering from an empty space 
inside her, can be understood as expressive of what Klein calls «the dread of 
being alone, of the loss of love and loss of the love-object,» and which we have 
seen as following the introjection of «complete persons» in what Klein would 
later call the depressive position. Since, on Klein’s view, this feeling of loss 
comes about from the child’s own sadistic tendencies (including her imagining 
the loss of her mother), a feeling of emptiness results when an individual can-
not creatively repair, or move on from, the imagined destruction of the loved 
object.36 Therefore, Klein’s claim is that, for Kjär, portrait-painting constituted 
a form of creative reparation that had been heretofore unavailable to her. (Klein 
notes that «In the analysis of children,» following the expression of destructive 
tendencies, «we constantly find that drawing and painting are used as means 
to restore people,» IA: 217-8.37)
35  Olsen reproduces a version of this painting of Josephine Baker: «Depression 
and Reparation,» 39.
36  Indeed, in Klein’s analysis of Dick, it was exactly Dick’s lacking this capacity, 
and consequently his being unable to work through his anxiety about the imagined 
destruction of his loved objects, that impeded the development of his capacity for 
symbol-formation (and thus impeded his capacity to take affective interest in his envi-
ronment, particularly other persons). Again, for an understanding of symbol-formation 
as itself a kind of creative reparation, or working-through of the depressive position, 
see Segal, «A Psychoanalytic Approach to Aesthetics,» 196.
37  According to Olsen, this particularly arose during Klein’s analysis of the 
ten-year-old boy Richard (OCEA: 370-97; NC): «His long series of abstract coloured 
drawings lend themselves to interpretation as attempts to bring forward the inner images 
of his parents’ entangled body parts (which manifest themselves in the paranoid-schiz-
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 Indeed, Klein draws specific attention to the fact that «apart from one 
picture of flowers, [Kjär] had confined herself to portraits.» And it is important 
to consider how Klein countenances Michaëlis’s description of the difference 
between two portraits that Kjär painted. Michaëlis describes one picture re-
presenting «an old woman, bearing the marks of years and disillusionments»:
Her skin is wrinkled, her hair faded, her gentle, tired eyes are troubled. She gazes 
before her with the disconsolate resignation of old age, with a look that seems to 
say: «Do not trouble about me any more. My time is so nearly at an and!»
This is not the impression we receive from Ruth’s latest work—the portrait of her 
Irish-Canadian mother. This lady has a long time before her before she must put 
her lips to the cup of resignation. Slim, imperious, challenging, she stands there 
with a moonlight coloured shawl draped over her shoulders: she has the effect of 
a magnificent woman of primitive times, who could any day engage in combat 
with the children of the desert with her naked hands. What a chin! What force 
there is in the haughty gaze! The blank space has been filled (IA: 217).
About the contrast between these portraits Klein says:
It is obvious that the desire to make reparation, to make good the injury psycho-
logically done to the mother and also to restore herself was at the bottom of the 
compelling urge to paint these portraits of her relatives. That of the old woman, 
on the threshold of death, seems to be the expression of the primary, sadistic 
wish to destroy. The daughter’s wish to destroy her mother, to see her old, worn 
out, marred, is the cause of the need to represent her in full possession of her 
strength and beauty. By doing so the daughter can allay her own anxiety and can 
endeavour to restore her mother and make her new through the portrait (IA: 218).
It is understandable that Klein associates a portrait of a woman «on the 
threshold of death» with destructive tendencies and a portrait of one’s mother 
«in full possession of her strength and beauty» with reparative tendencies. 
oid position as anxiety-ridden part objects) to the depressive position and afterwards 
to a healing of the ruined parental images» (Olsen, «Depression and reparation,» 37). 
In a provocative commentary on his own portrait-making, which happens to speak to 
many of these Kleinian themes, Antonin Artaud remarks on a kind of destructiveness 
characteristic of seeing a human face (familiar from Klein’s writing on the fantasies of 
destruction or loss characteristic of appreciating others as complete persons), which the 
portraitist must restore creatively: «For the human face,/ in fact, wears/ a perpetual death 
of sorts/ on its face/ which it is incumbent on the painter precisely/ to save it from/ by 
restoring/ its own features»: Artaud, «Le visage humain…,» trans. Roger McKeon, in 
Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper, ed. Margit Rowell (New York: Museum of Modern 
Art, 1996), 97. I am indebted to Luigi Patruno for pointing me to the latter work.
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But Klein’s deeper thought is that these tendencies are not in stark opposition: 
the reparative tendencies are the normal response to the destructive ones, 
and typically an individual will oscillate between the two.38 Moreover, I have 
argued for an interpretation of Klein according to which both tendencies are 
responses to the non-repeatable individuality of persons: when we care about 
non-repeatable individuals (or about their differential recognition), the possi-
bility of their loss or destruction is especially distressing, and so the question 
of their reparation through creativity (which cannot involve finding «mere 
substitutes,» or further versions of that same person) is especially urgent. 
Therefore, if we ever encounter a portrait that expresses one tendency to the 
exclusion of the other, we will likely be frustrated by its overly narrow range 
of response to the individuality of its subject.
 To return to our original concerns, then: we can understand Simmel 
as registering the fact that Rembrandt’s portraits do not elicit that frustration. 
Earlier I expressed confusion about the purpose of Simmel’s suggestion that, 
at least in Rembrandt’s portraits, life stands in a kind of dialectical unity with 
death. This suggestion did not seem relevant to the connection that Simmel 
was trying to establish between depictions of mortality and depictions of in-
dividuality, since it seemed consistent with the schema of general traits that 
Rembrandt’s portraits (in their depictions of non-repeatable individuality) 
were supposed to escape. But if Simmel’s metaphysical account was in fact 
gesturing at the mutual dependence of destructive and reparative tendencies 
that we find in Klein’s writing, then the connection to individuality is now less 
obscure: unless we cared about non-repeatable individuals, we would not be 
either distressed at their destruction or motivated to do the work of reparation 
following that (imagined or real) loss.39
 Therefore, for Simmel, Rembrandt’s distinctive achievement was to 
capture the full range of those destructive and reparative tendencies through 
38  Again, the ordinariness of such oscillation is a reason why Klein chose to 
talk about «positions» as opposed to «phases;» cf. Segal, Introduction to the Work of 
Melanie Klein, ix
39  For a remarkable Klein-inspired unearthing of themes of destruction and 
reparation in the paintings of Nicolas Poussin, but which tends to focus on Poussin’s 
representations of «nature’s ambivalence» in his landscapes, rather than on the special 
salience of those themes for representations of individuals in portraiture, see Richard 
Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 226-31ff. 
See also Wollheim’s treatment of the «resuscitation» of the father in Ingres’s portrait 
of Louis-François Bertin (Louvre, Paris), op. cit. 277-80: a resuscitation that is not 
explicitly concerned with mortality but rather with humanizing the father after having 
idealized him (although this is an idealization that, from a Kleinian perspective, may 
itself be a defense against fear of losing objects).
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which we respond to an individual’s non-repeatability, not just across his works, 
and not just within particular portraits, but often in single expressive strokes.40
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